EU opens a page in history. Challenges and benefits of accession negotiations for Ukraine

What happened on Tuesday seemed utterly impossible two years ago, but it has been eagerly anticipated in the last year.

On 25 June in Luxembourg, the European Affairs Ministers of all EU member states and the Ukrainian government delegation announced the formal start of accession negotiations with Ukraine.

According to EU procedures, the announcement of the formal start of accession negotiations is more symbolic than substantive. It does not imply achievement of any compromises or agreements. It starts a legal process that ultimately should lead to Ukraine’s full EU membership.

But Ukraine’s path here also proved to be unique.

Simultaneously with the launch of the negotiations, it was necessary to negotiate a trilateral compromise between Ukraine, the EU and Hungary – an openly anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian government, which is an EU member but often acts contrary to the common European position. To get greenlit, Ukraine had to “legalise” 11 demands posed by Hungary to our legislation.

However, the Hungarian side of this story is not yet finished, and negotiations will continue.

It’s important to note that the toxic Hungarian issue is only one element of the puzzle. Most of the requirements awaiting Ukraine concern reforms, and the EU is not yet revealing all its cards.

European Pravda offers an explanation of what happened in Luxembourg, whether the start of accession negotiations between Ukraine and the EU is final, and what requirements Ukraine faces in this process.

Racing against Hungary

Kyiv and Brussels were in a hurry to start accession negotiations, and this has not been a secret for a long time. Moreover, last year Ukrainian officials and diplomats had optimistic hopes that the process could be launched by the end of 2023.

However, Hungary’s resistance made this impossible.

As a reminder, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban intended to block European integration of Ukraine altogether in December 2023, but joint pressure from the rest of the EU capitals forced him to give in – this is when the now legendary event took place, when Orban “went out for coffee” to deliberately miss the vote on Ukraine and not veto it.

At that time, with Budapest’s tacit consent, EU leaders made a fundamental decision that accession negotiations should begin – but the question remained as to when exactly.

Next, Kyiv had hoped that the process would start of this process in March-April, but the dates were postponed again.

A number of European Pravda sources in Brussels and in friendly EU countries claim that several political players supported the new postponement. But the key role was once again played by a Hungarian – European Commissioner Oliver Varhelyi, together with officials loyal to him, who blocked the launch of the necessary procedures for more than two months.

Finally, a compromise was reached.

As the EU had been preparing for the European Parliament elections since spring, the start of Ukrainian (and, along with them, Moldovan) negotiations was postponed until after the vote, but with the categorical condition that it must happen дbefore the end of June.

The fact is that starting from July 1, Hungary will have even more power, as it will become the presiding country in the EU Council for six months.

It would be almost impossible to start negotiations with Ukraine during their presidency (because in this case, one of the Hungarian ministers would have to personally bless Ukraine on its way to accession, and Orban would definitely not agree to such humiliation). Meanwhile, postponing the launch of the process for another six months would be humiliating for everyone else.

Therefore, all resources were used to lobby for the June date, and in the end the effort was successful.

Orban’s 11 demands

To complete the Hungarian issue, a fly in the ointment should be added.

Orban is highly skilled at playing on the problems of others and in situations where other players are limited in time. This happened this time as well – after all, the decision on the start date of the negotiations required a Hungarian vote “in favour” (or at least “we are not in favour, but also not against it, but “we just happened to go out for coffee”).

So, Budapest used formal reasons to the last moment to slow down the process, and, having waited for the moment when there was no time to find new levers of pressure, issued an ultimatum. Hungary agreed to the Intergovernmental Conference only if the EU, for its part, forced Ukraine to comply with Hungarian demands regarding Transcarpathia.

The other EU member states agreed and Budapest lifted its veto.

It was June 14, the day when many rejoiced at the news of Hungary’s concessions. But the very next day, Hungary issued a statement that made many nervous. The head of Orban’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peter Szijjártó, said that, allegedly, Hungarian demands were integrated into the negotiating framework for Ukraine (it includes requirements that Ukraine definitely cannot bypass on the way to joining). Given the appetites of Orban’s government and its openly anti-Ukrainian position, this news sounded alarming.

Now that the framework is finally approved, it can be argued that the reality is somewhat different.

Based on the final documents, the Hungarian demands were somewhat softened.

The framework adopted on June 25 does not contain what Szijjártó mentioned; there are only separate hints at Hungary’s position.

Instead, some “Hungarian” theses appeared in the negotiation statement on behalf of Ukraine. Olha Stefanishyna announced that Kyiv intends to “resolve” the 11 problematic issues that Hungary handed over to Ukraine at the meeting of Szijjártó with Dmytro Kuleba and Andriy Yermak in January. EP sources confirm that this became an element of a compromise agreement.

The “minority” demands, essentially, were moved from the strict preconditions for Ukraine’s accession to the EU to the block of Kyiv’s “self-commitments.” This is definitely a good thing.

The fact that the 11 demands are not public and, as numerous sources testify, vague, however, is rather bad.

European Pravda is currently preparing a separate publication that will analyse the consequences and challenges of this compromise for Ukraine.

For now, let’s put aside the Hungarian challenge, because it is actually only a small element of the event that took place in Luxembourg on June 25. Negotiations on Ukraine’s accession give rise to much larger processes.

What happens in the near future

As mentioned above, the first Intergovernmental Conference at ministerial level to open accession negotiations with Ukraine, the official name of this event (hereinafter – Intergovernmental Conference) is only a formal start of negotiations.

There will be no public events on this track in the next six months. And not only because this is the half-year of Hungary’s presidency.

The next few months will also see a change of power in the EU, the appointment of a new European Commissioner for Enlargement (Hungarians will definitely not be allowed into the Ukrainian portfolio now), the formation of his/her team, etc.

In addition, preparation for the next steps objectively takes time (and this preparation deserves special attention, which we will address further).

The beginning of 2025 will open a new window of opportunity for Ukraine.

Poland’s presidency in the EU Council starts January 1.

And no matter the claims and complaints we have (quite rightly) against the Polish government, we must admit that Warsaw is our unconditional partner and lobbyist in the issue of Ukraine’s political integration into the EU. It is during the Polish presidency that the real start of negotiations between Ukraine and the EU is expected.

Despite the importance of the June 25 event, this week there was only a formal, ceremonial start of the process. In order to really negotiate the adaptation of Ukraine to EU law, it is necessary to open the first negotiation chapters and we expect to do this during the Polish presidency.

The first one or several chapters to be opened will be from the “fundamentals cluster”, for example, the chapter on justice, or freedoms and security, or public procurement. This decision, as they say in Brussels, has not yet been made.

And then the speed will largely depend on us.

The progress we show in reaching the target indicators for the first “fundamentals cluster” will determine how quickly the EU will open subsequent negotiation chapters and clusters.

If Kyiv simply imitates European integration instead of actually carrying it out, there will be no progress in the negotiations, and there will be stagnation, as in the Western Balkans states. In this case, it will not be possible to shift the blame to the Hungarians.

“Progress in the fundamentals’ cluster will determine the overall pace of negotiations and will be taken into account when deciding whether to open or close new clusters or chapters,” the negotiating framework emphasizes.

By the way, in order to implement the nearest plans and have time to start negotiations during the “Polish window,” Kyiv also has some serious work to do.

Six months between the first Intergovernmental Conference and the opening of the first chapters is a very ambitious goal. During this time, Ukraine, together with the EU, must complete the screening of all “fundamentals’ chapters”, which involve analysis of Ukrainian legislation for compliance with EU law.

The next step is to form and agree with the European Commission several action plans (i.e., reform plans with implementation indicators) for chapters on the rule of law, protection of minorities (which is where Hungary is to be considered), functioning of democratic institutions, reform of public administration, etc.

None of the states currently conducting accession negotiations have carried out this work in such a short time frame, but the Ukrainian government is confident that the goal is realistic.

Negotiations and leverage

Finally, it is necessary to write about further accession negotiations and their specifics for Ukraine.

Based on the text of the negotiating framework presented by the EU on Tuesday, the overall approach remains the same as approved in 2021 for the “newest” candidates – North Macedonia and Albania. European Pravda has the text of the Macedonian framework at its disposal; it coincides with the Ukrainian one by approximately 95%.

In addition, unfortunately, the voting for the opening of all negotiation chapters remains in effect – Ukraine will have to seek consensus each time, that is, the absence of a Hungarian veto. Practice shows that this goal is achievable, but requires effort.

It has already been mentioned above that the main guarantee of Ukraine’s success is changes in the issues of justice, democracy, the system of public administration, etc. Without this, there is no chance of success in the accession negotiations.

Indicators related to these sections will accompany Kyiv throughout the negotiation process. For example, in the area of the rule of law, the EU will first establish indicators for opening substantive negotiations on the chapter. Then, it will form “intermediate control benchmarks,” the achievement of which will indicate that Ukraine has preliminarily fulfilled the EU requirements. Finally, the EU will approve a new set of “control benchmarks” in this area for Ukraine to confirm the closure of negotiations.

This multi-layered scheme assures the EU that the candidate country, Ukraine, will not find a way to formally fulfil the requirements without implementing substantial reforms.

Finally, the EU retains a “nuclear tool.” If reforms regress, any previous EU decisions (opening, closing chapters, recognizing progress, or even the decision to negotiate) can be halted or reversed.

“In the case of a serious and persistent breach by Ukraine of the values on which the Union is founded, the Commission can, on its own initiative or at the duly motivated request of a Member State, recommend the suspension of negotiations and propose the conditions for eventual resumption,” the negotiating framework states. A detailed process for stopping and resuming negotiations is also outlined, with the first possible reason being “any serious or prolonged stagnation or backsliding in reform implementation in the fundamentals cluster.” This is not a mechanism specific to Ukraine. The same approach applies to other candidates and has been used in the past.

Negotiations with Turkey have long been suspended with no real chance of resumption. However, it is crucial to remember this mechanism. Ukraine aims to conduct quick accession negotiations, but without real reforms, especially in democracy, rule of law, etc., the result may be the opposite. Perhaps the only change regarding the possibility of reversing European integration, which was added to the Ukrainian (and Moldovan) framework, concerns sectoral integration.

The European Union has provided for candidate countries to gradually utilize the benefits of European integration before they are fully ready to join the EU. This particularly concerns access to the single market, albeit with certain restrictions. The framework states, “If Ukraine makes sufficient progress on reform priorities agreed in the negotiations, this should lead to closer integration with the European Union, through accelerated integration and “phasing in” to individual EU policies, the EU market and EU programmes.” However, the negotiating framework also states that this process can potentially be reversed.

The European Union essentially ensures flexibility for itself in case of unforeseen events. “By their very nature, the negotiations are an open-ended process whose outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand,” the document reminds us, while emphasizing that the EU’s goal is the successful implementation of the entire plan, culminating in Ukraine’s accession to the EU.

eurointegration.com.ua