Propaganda funding to be restricted. How the EU plans to counter Russian disinformation

Can the EU put an end to Russian propaganda?

This issue becomes especially relevant considering that the recently adopted 14th EU sanctions package includes a clause that “prohibits political parties, foundations, alliances, non-governmental organizations, including think tanks and media service providers in the EU from accepting financing, donations, or any other economic benefits or support from Russia, whether directly or indirectly.

This restriction was implemented in response to “Russia’s continued attempts to interfere in democratic processes and undermine the democratic foundations” of the European Union through influence campaigns and disinformation, among other tactics.

The activities of Russian agents of influence in other countries are not a new phenomenon. Western countries have been aware of such activities since the Cold War but countering them within a democratic framework is quite challenging.

Freedom of speech and respect for citizens’ rights are cornerstones of European democracy, allowing for criticism of government decisions, which is essential for maintaining accountability, and the free exchange of ideas to find solutions that benefit society.

Under this approach, banning any viewpoint or expression is unacceptable (with very few exceptions). It is also unacceptable to investigate income sources or intercept private communications without evidence of criminal activity.

Russian agents of influence exploit these freedoms to publicly promote Russian narratives and create opportunities for Russian propagandists.

Learning from mistakes

The widespread Russian funding of far-right groups in Europe, known for promoting anti-democratic ideologies, is a well-documented fact. This financial support is likely a contributing factor to the increasing weight and influence these groups hold in European politics.

Furthermore, a journalistic investigation based on leaked emails from the organisers of an influence campaign revealed that these far-right forces were subsequently used to further Russian interests in shaping European policy regarding the occupied territories of Ukraine.

The Russians not only established a network of analysts and journalists but also promoted resolutions in local councils and financed trips for representatives of these political forces to the occupied territories of Ukraine, aiming to legitimise the annexation.

The EU has previously attempted to limit Russian influence through sanctions. In July 2023, two Russian citizens, Ilya Gambashidze, founder of the Moscow company Agency of Social Design, and Nikolai Tupikin, CEO and current owner of the Russian company Group Structura LLC, were added to the sanctions list.

They are accused of providing services to the Russian government in connection with a “foreign malicious influence campaign” known in Europe as Doppelgänger. In March 2024, these individuals and their businesses were also sanctioned by the US.

Despite this, the campaign continues, indicating that personal sanctions against Russian citizens and their businesses have been ineffective. These individuals operate from within Russia, where their free access to the internet, the primary tool for the campaign, is unaffected by financial restrictions.

A broader ban on receiving funding from Russian sources, introduced by the EU in June, seems to be a more effective solution, depriving agents of influence of resources. This measure targets those within European countries, falling under the jurisdiction of European law enforcement agencies. The regime allows exceptions if it can be proven that Russian funds will not be used for malicious influence or disinformation.

Difficulties of implementation

The decision to impose restrictive measures is just the first step. Their effectiveness hinges on successful implementation, which presents challenges for the EU.

Decisions on restrictions are made centrally under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, but individual member states are responsible for enforcing them at the national level. Significant discrepancies exist among member states in both legislation and the authority of the bodies responsible for oversight.

To harmonize the enforcement of sanctions and reduce market distortions caused by uneven enforcement, the EU adopted Directive No. 2024/1226 in April 2024. This directive defines criminal offenses and penalties for violating EU restrictive measures. It came into effect on May 14, 2024, and must be integrated into member state legislation by May 20, 2025.

Until then, approaches across countries will remain diverse. Even afterward, the outcome will depend on the effectiveness of administrative and law enforcement systems.

However, this solution has a further drawback: by focusing on Russian influence, Europeans overlook the fact that Russian and Chinese narratives about the war in Ukraine largely align. Yet, there are currently no bans on Chinese sources in the EU.

The difference of Ukraine’s approach

Ukraine was the first to enforce sanctions to combat Russian interference through agents of influence. A striking example is the ban on the so-called “Medvedchuk channels.” In early February 2021, President Zelenskyy, by decree, approved the decision of the National Security and Defence Council to impose sanctions against the 112, ZIK, and NewsOne TV channels owned by Taras Kozak, a member of parliament from the Opposition Platform – For Life (OPFL) faction.

At the time, presidential spokeswoman Yulia Mendel explained the ban was motivated by the channels’ deviation from journalistic standards and their transformation into mouthpieces for Russian propaganda. She also emphasized that Russian funding of the channels had been confirmed.

While both European and Ukrainian sanctions share similar goals and motivations, their approaches to fundamental human rights differ.

After studying how the threat operates, European officials prohibited receiving funding from Russian sources. Violators of this clear prohibition will be held accountable through investigations and legal proceedings by European law enforcement agencies.

In Ukraine, however, no ban on funding from Russia was enforced when sanctions were imposed against Kozak. Therefore, from a legal standpoint, it’s unclear what laws the owner of these channels violated. Had such a ban been in place, the violation, posing a threat to national security, should have been addressed through a criminal trial, as Mr. Kozak is a Ukrainian citizen.

Instead, he was placed on a sanctions list and stripped of numerous rights without investigation or trial. Although few questioned the necessity of restrictive measures against the “Medvedchuk channels,” this approach raises concerns about the rule of law.

This could not only lead to a lawsuit in the European Court of Human Rights to restore violated rights but also hinder Ukraine’s progress towards EU accession.

In conclusion, the EU has developed a mechanism to limit the activities of Russian agents of influence without infringing upon the fundamental rights and freedoms of EU citizens. As with any decision, its effectiveness will depend on the enforcement, which may present challenges.

At the same time, limiting restrictions solely to Russian funding sources leaves this mechanism unable to address other international actors engaging in political warfare against the EU and the West.

Ukraine should examine this mechanism and adapt it to its own sanctions policy to avoid potential obstacles on its path to EU membership.

eurointegration.com.ua